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This was a sparse year in the development of the law of evi-
dence. The South Carolina Supreme Court, which in recent years
has seemed to welcome the opportunity to clarify some of the
hazy concepts which abound in the field,' had to confine itself
this year to confirming the obvious. During the period under
review, not a single evidence question was presented to the court
which justified more than the briefest consideration.
Typical of the ease with which the evidence points were ruled
upon is the holding in Mulkey v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.2
that the "proof of loss" submitted by an insured to his fire in-
surer was admissible in the subsequent law suit to prove com-
pliance with the provisions of the policy but could not be con-
sidered for the factual statements which it contained.
Two questions in the field of expert testimony were also easily
disposed of. In Conner v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank8 a mason-
ry contractor had testified in a suit by a tenant against her land-
lord for personal injuries allegedly caused by negligent repair
of the premises that in his expert opinion the mortar between
the bricks in the floor of the apartment had been improperly
mixed. The defendant maintained that this testimony was irrele-
vant because the witness's examination was not made until a
year after the plaintiff was injured, but the court held that there
was no showing that his ability to determine the basic constitu-
ency of the mortar was affected by the lapse of time. In Glenn v.
Dunean Mills4 it was held that an expert's opinion, expressed in
reply to a hypothetical question, that the plaintiff's intestate
could not have been killed by an over-exposure to freon in an
industrial operation was not conclusive of the issue because the
hypothetical question had not taken into consideration all of the
physical aspects of the occurrence. 5
* Lecturer in Law, University of South Carolina.
1. For example, the exception to the hearsay rule for testimony at a former
trial rationalized so clearly in Gaines v. Thomas, 241 S.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 692
(1962), and the much needed holding in Watson v. Wall, 239 S.C. 109, 121
S.E.2d 427 (1961), that no out-of-court assertion is hearsay unless it is offered
to prove the truth of the matter stated.
2. 243 S.C. 121, 132 S.E.2d 278 (1963).
3. 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
4. 242 S.C. 535, 131 S.E.2d 696 (1963).
5. It should be noted that the admissability of the testimony was not in issue.
It is generally held that the facts put to an expert witness in a hypothetical
1
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The perennial problem of how to treat evidence which is ad-
missible for one purpose but likely to be used by the jury for
an incompetent purpose was raised in Knight v. Johnson,6 but
not in a very serious aspect. The plaintiff in an automobile
collision case was said by a police officer to have driven away
from the town of Simpsonville in a "fast manner," to have ap-
peared angry and upset, and to have stated that he was taking
his son to a doctor and "no one could stop him." His counsel
argued that the scene of the accident was two miles away and
his conduct at Simpsonville could not be of any probative value
on the question of how he was driving when he and the defend-
ant collided. The court held that was correct, but that the testi-
mony of the policeman was competent to show the "motive and
purpose" of the plaintiff on the entire trip.
In State v. Jlyder7 one of the police witnesses testified that
he had climbed a tree and observed through binoculars the
defendant working a liquor still about two hundred yards away.
To refute this, the defendant's brother testified that he had
climbed the tallest tree he could find in the vicinity of the police-
man's tree and found that it was impossible to recognize people
at the still site with binoculars. The binoculars which the brother
had used were offered in evidence. The policeman then took the
stand again to introduce a pair of binoculars which he said were
identical to those he had used. The defendant objected to the
admission of the exhibit.
Without actually discussing the relevancy of the evidence, the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed because it was unable
to see how the defendant could have been prejudiced by the ex-
hibit. Counsel argued that it was possible that the glasses orig-
inally used by the police officer could have been defective in some
way, but the court said there is no evidence of this and that the
condition of the glasses could have easily been explored on cross-
examination. The court added that the record did not show that
any experiment was performed with the glasses at the scene
where they had been used. This was very likely right but one
would hate to bet that the jury did not look out of their court
house window at a person two hundred yards away with both
pairs of glasses.
question do not have to be uncontradicted, it being sufficient if they are sup-
ported by some evidence in the record. McCoRmicic, EVIDENcE § 14 (1954).
6. 244 S.C. 70, 135 S.E.2d 372 (1964).
7. 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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In four cases involving the impeachment of witnesses the
court merely announced and applied long established rules: in
Daniel v. Hazel" that a witness's previous plea of guilty to an
indictment charging him with a crime of fraud may be brought
out on his cross-examination; in Graham v. Aetna Ins. Co.0 that
when a witness admits on cross-examination the making of a
written statement at variance with his present testimony, the
instrument itself is not admissible; in Gilfillan v. Gilfillan'0
that a party may not impeach his own witness by producing a
previous contradictory statement of the witness except upon a
showing of surprise; and in State v. Morris" that an accused
who takes the stand in a murder case may, by way of impeach-
ment, be asked about a previous murder conviction despite the
fact that his testimony agrees with the state's in all matters
except his motive for the killing.
In State v. Young 12 the court applied the settled South Caro-
lina rule that an objection as to the relevancy of testimony is
waived when the objector cross-examines on the same matter
without specifically reserving the objection.13
In Hodges v. Hodges'4 the court applied against a wife who
claimed her husband got drunk at a family dinner but failed to
call as witnesses her relatives who were present, the presumption
that if they had been called they would not have corroborated
her. The best recent delineation of the type of relationship be-
tween party and witness which will give rise to this presumption
may be found in Davis v. Sparks.'5
Although the rights of a party are not concluded by state-
ments made against him by one of his witnesses if other wit-
nesses testify to the contrary, Elrod v. All'0 recognized that a
party's own testimony against himself on a certain point does
conclude that point against him.
8. 242 S.C. 443, 131 S.E.2d 260 (1963).
9. 243 S.C. 108, 132 S.E.2d 273 (1963).
10. 242 S.C. 258, 130 S.E.2d 578 (1963).
11. 243 S.C. 225, 133 S.E.2d 744 (1963).
12. 243 S.C. 187, 133 S.E.2d 210 (1963).
13. That this is a minority rule and an unfortunate one see McCoRmic,
EVIDENCE § 55 (1954). Most courts consider that the original objection makes
it obvious that counsel would not have gone into the matter at all had he not
been forced to by the court's ruling and that he cannot reasonably be considered
to have so foolishly waived his objection.
14. 243 S.C. 299, 133 S.E.2d 816 (1963).
15. 235 S.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 545 (1959).
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There were two cases decided on the parol evidence rule dur-
ing the review period. The first of these, 13pencer v. Republic
National Life Ins. Co.,17 was an action on a group life insurance
policy which contained a provision that if an employee was not
on active, full-time work when the policy became effective, he
would have coverage only from the date when he returned to
work. The policy was issued as of February 1, 1961, but not ac-
tually delivered to the group employer until a month later. The
plaintiff's intestate entered a hospital on January 14, 1961 and
died on February 2, 1961. The soliciting agent for the insurer
testified that he had represented to the employer that all em-
ployees who were covered by another company's policy expiring
on January 31 would be similarly covered by his policy which
was to take effect the next day. This testimony was objected to
by the insurer on the ground that it tended to vary the terms
of the written contract. The South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the objection had been properly overruled. In the applica-
tion form there was language indicating the intention of the
parties that the policy was to be issued as a replacement of the
policy then in effect and the court stated that this was probably
enough to justify the admission of parol evidence to clarify the
intent hinted at in the writing. It found it unnecessary, however,
to decide the point and held that the testimony was clearly admis-
sible to show an estoppel on the part of the insurer to rely on the
contract language. The result would seem to be justifiable on
either theory.
The other case involving the parol evidence rule is Cooke v.
Jennings & Cooke.' Mr. and Mrs. Cooke had signed, along with
Mr. and irs. Jennings, a lease covering certain business proper-
ties at Myrtle Beach. After the Cookes were divorced, she sued
him for an accounting of the profits of the business. Upon the
testimony of Mr. Cooke and the other parties to the transaction
that Mrs. Cooke had no interest at all in the business and had
signed the lease agreement purely to give some additional se-
curity to the lessor, the master and the circuit judge found for
the defendants. The case was appealed on the sole point that the
testimony as to the lack of any interest in the business by Mrs.
Cooke violated the parol evidence rule and should have been
excluded. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the parol
evidence rule does not prevent parties on the same side of a writ-
17. 243 S.C. 317, 133 S.E.2d 826 (1963).
18. 243 S.C. 474, 134 S.E.2d 572 (1964).
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ten contract from showing by parol what the agreement was be-
tween themselves. The holding is in accordance with the general
rule and the authorities cited by the court amply support it. The
terms of the contract here ran between the lessor and the lessees.
There was no contract language governing the relationship of
the lessees, therefore, as to them there was nothing which the
parol evidence could to be said to have varied.
In McDonald v. Berry, 9 the natural parents of a child that
had been adopted by others brought an action against the lawyer
who had handled the adoption to require him to disclose the
names and addresses of the adoptive parents, the petition indicat-
ing a purpose to bring a suit to set aside the adoption. The Rich-
land County Court ordered Mr. Berry to give the information
but he appealed instead, and the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed. One of Mr. Berry's contentions was that the adoption
matter was entirely within the attorney and client privilege. The
court expressed some doubt as to this, saying, with the support of
general authorities, that normally the identity of a particular
client is not privileged but that an address given by a client to a
lawyer in confidence may be. The reversal was on broader
grounds, the court saying that in all domestic matters involving
children the welfare of the child is the controlling consideration
and that the welfare of an adopted child could be completely
disrupted if he and his new parents could be sought out and ha-
rassed by the parents who had given him away. The court does
not hold, of course, that it would never be possible for natural
parents who had a meritorious cause of action for the annulment
of an adoption to require the disclosure of the whereabouts of the
child. It simply says that the vague showing of need for the in-
formation made by the petitioner here was not sufficient to justi-
fy the disclosure and the social hazards which could flow from it.
The most interesting case reviewed was the United States
Court of Appeals, Fburth Circuit, decision in United States v.
Alexander.20 This is rather surprising as it involved the usually
cut-and-dried rule of "best evidence." The defendant had been
convicted in the federal district court at Greenville of removing
a government check from a mail box. The Government's case
rested solely upon the circumstantial evidence that he had been
found with a Social Security check payable to a Mrs. Woodall in
his possession a short distance from Mrs. Woodall's mail box, in
19. 243 S.C. 453, 134 S.E.2d 392 (1964).
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which, according to her, such a check should have been deposited
that morning. The apprehending officer described the check in
fair detail, but it was not produced at the trial and no explana-
tion of its unavailability, sufficient to permit secondary evidence,
was attempted by the Government. One of the officers had made
an effort, while the check was in his possession, to have a Therm-
ofax reproduction of it made but some portions had not repro-
duced properly and these were claimed to have been added by
typewriter. The question before the court of appeals was whether
this informally made copy and the general description by the of-
ficers of the original check were admissible against a "best evi-
dence" objection.
The court, speaking through Judge Boreman, reversed the
conviction. The opinion begins by adopting the clearly expressed
view of the evidence experts21 that the best evidence rule applies
only when the terms of a document are at issue and that it never
bars testimony as to other facts about the document, such as its
existence or its identity. It held, however, that the terms of this
check were materially at issue in the prosecution and that the
check had to be produced or its unavailability established before
secondary evidence could be admitted.
The argument which the Government presented on the appeal
appears at first to be reasonably sound and the defendant's
purely technical. If the defendant had been accused of removing
a book from the mail box, a general description of the book
would have been sufficient, and it could not have been argued
that what was written in the book-its terms-were material to
the case and required the original book's production. Judge Bore-
man said, however, and on analysis his conclusion seems more
sound, that the exact terms of the check were of crucial import-
ance in the Government's effort to establish by circumstantial
evidence that this particular check had been taken from Mrs.
Woodall's mailbox. Consider, he says in perhaps his most telling
argument, "the effect of a witness's failure to notice, or a repro-
ducing machine's failure to copy, an endorsement on the back of
the check. We are convinced that it was for the purpose of avoid-
ing the possibility of such errors as might have occurred here
that the best evidence rule was formulated."
When thus scrutinized, the reversal based upon a small point
of evidence of what was very likely a just conviction, does not
seem so technical after all.
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